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Abstract
Collaborative spectrum sensing has attracted significant research attention in the last few years and is widely
accepted as a viable approach to improve spectrum sensing reliability. Fusing data from multiple opportunistic
users (OUs) in order to produce reliable sensing results implies a reliance on the OU to provide correct
information. In the presence of malfunctioning or selfish users, performance of collaborative spectrum sensing
deteriorates significantly. In this article, we propose mechanisms for the detection and suppression of such
deleterious opportunistic users (DOUs) for hard and soft decision fusion. More specifically, a credibility based
mechanism for hard decision fusion using a beta reputation system (HDC-BR) is introduced. Our proposed
method does not require knowledge of the total number of deleterious users in advance. In HDC-BR, the fusion
center assigns and updates weights to each user’s decisions based on an individual user credibility score which is
calculated using the beta reputation system. The presence of DOUs in soft decision based collaborative spectrum
sensing has even more adverse effects on system performance. We also propose a scheme for the case of soft
decision fusion to detect and eliminate falsified user observations at the fusion centre using a Modified Grubbs
Test; we refer to it as SDC-MG. We compare the performance of the proposed methods with malicious user
detection schemes proposed in the literature as well as with the case where no DOU suppression scheme is
implemented, and conclude that SDC-MG performs much better than HDC-BR in a low Signal to Noise Ratio
(SNR) regime.
Index Terms
Cognitive Radio, Collaborative Spectrum Sensing, Reputation Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Opportunistic users operation relies on radio environment knowledge provided by geo-location databases or
by spectrum sensing [1]. One most crucial task of an OU is to identify the presence of Incumbent Users
(IUs) with high reliability over a wide spectrum. In a 2010 FCC ruling [1], a geo-location database based
query mechanism was proposed for the protection of IU’s, eliminating the need for spectrum sensing, initially
required, back in 2008 [2]. However, spectrum regulators, including the Ofcom in UK and FCC in USA, still
encourage researchers to continue research on spectrum sensing [3].
Several local and collaborative spectrum sensing schemes are available in the literature and a comprehensive
survey has published in [4]. In collaborative or centralised spectrum sensing, a central entity controls the overall
October 18, 2012 DRAFT
2sensing operation, referred to as the fusion centre in remainder of this article. Opportunistic users taking part
in collaborative spectrum sensing may send a soft decision (i.e. local observation) or hard decision (i.e. 1-bit
decision) to the fusion centre, termed SDC and HDC respectively. In this article, we use energy detection for
local spectrum sensing and consider both HDC and SDC based collaborative spectrum sensing. It should be
noted that energy detection based sensing is used for simplicity and the proposed mechanisms are applicable
in the case of any other sensing technique.
Most current collaborative spectrum sensing schemes assume that all OUs are honest, trustworthy and without
any hardware faults [5]–[8]. An opportunistic user may be malign and send false information to the fusion centre
e.g. due to device malfunctioning or selfish reasons. For instance, a selfish user may send sensing information to
the fusion centre that an incumbent signal is present so that the fusion centre makes a wrong decision, allowing
the selfish user to transmit its own signal on the free channel. A user may also send wrong information
unintentionally due to defects or faults in its hardware. Identification of such users is a challenging task. In
this article, such users are referred as DOUs and we assume that they send wrong sensing data because of
aforementioned reasons. It has been shown in the literature that the presence of even a single DOU can severely
degrade the performance of collaborative spectrum sensing [9].
There is limited literature that addresses collaborative spectrum sensing in the presence of DOUs. In [9], a
simple approach was proposed in which opportunistic users report yes or no that indicates either IU present or
absent, respectively. If there are k DOUs then the fusion centre declares yes only if at least k + 1 users report
yes. This approach has many disadvantages e.g. it requires the exact number of DOUs to be known in advance
and the approach cannot be applied if users report soft information to the fusion centre. In [10], the credibility
of users is taken into consideration, based on each users detection and false alarm rate, but this approach does
not consider potential cheating behavior. Similarly, the approach proposed in [11] can differentiate between
honest and deleterious users when there is a single deleterious user but the scheme cannot be applied when
there are multiple DOUs. In [12], an approach based on reporting histories of opportunistic users has been
presented for the detection of compromised nodes in collaborative spectrum sensing. The approach presented
in [12] requires that the fusion centre have prior knowledge of the attackers policy, which is difficult to obtain in
practice. Secure collaborative spectrum sensing based on outlier detection techniques has been proposed in [13],
but assumes partial knowledge of incumbent user activity and proposed a malicious user detection scheme.
In this article, we investigate the effects of DOUs on collaborative spectrum sensing and consider both soft
and hard decision combining at the fusion centre. We consider a centralised system in which all opportunistic
users may send either soft or hard decisions to the fusion centre. The fusion centre makes a final decision using
a weighted approach where weights are calculated using proposed schemes (i.e. HDC-BR and SDC-MG). We
assume that the number of DOUs is unknown to the fusion centre. For the case of HDC, a robust credibility
based collaborative detection scheme to alleviate the vicious effects of deleterious users is proposed. In our
approach (HDC-BR), the fusion center calculates a credibility score of all OUs using a Bayesian formulation,
more specifically a Beta Reputation (BR) system. The credibility score of each user is used to calculate a
weight coefficient for the corresponding sensing result of that user at the fusion center. Initially, all users are
considered as reliable. User credibility is updated at each sensing interval by checking consistency between
global and local sensing decisions. Based on the credibility score, user information is weighted at the fusion
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3centre and hence less credible users have less effect on the global decision.
We also propose a DOU detection scheme based on a Modified Grubbs Test (SDC-MG) for the case of SDC.
The Grubbs test is used to detect a single outlier in normally distributed data. The modified Grubbs test, which
is used in this article can be implemented for the detection of any number of deleterious users. The fusion
centre identifies DOUs using the SDC-MG test and deletes observations from these users to nullify the effects
of falsified information. Furthermore, both proposed schemes are able to detect if a good user suddenly turns
bad and vice versa.
The rest of this article is organised as follows: In section II we describe the collaborative spectrum sensing
model. In section III we provide an overview of the beta reputation system and explain the proposed credibility
based collaborative spectrum sensing mechanism for HDC. We describe the modified Grubbs test based col-
laborative spectrum sensing scheme in section IV. Section V discusses the system parameters and simulation
results and, finally, conclusions are drawn in section VI. Boldface notation is used to represent vectors and [.]T
represents their transpose.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an incumbent user in a frequency band W and a group of K opportunistic users each equipped
with an energy detector, let the set of users be represented as Ω = {1, 2, 3, · · · ,K}. In addition, lets assume
that there are M DOUs in the system such that M < K. The OUs perform spectrum sensing during a sensing
interval T when instructed by the fusion centre and send their hard or soft decisions to the fusion centre through
control channels. We also assume error free control channels for the transmission of sensing information.
A. Local Spectrum Sensing
Spectrum sensing can be formulated as a binary hypothesis testing problem as follows [8],
xi(t) =
ni(t), ;H0his(t) + ni(t), ;H1 (1)
where i ∈ Ω, H0 represents the null hypothesis that only noise is present, H1 represents the alternate hypothesis
that both IU signal and noise is present. In equation (1), s(t) is the IU signal and is assumed to be an independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance σ2s . For the i
th OU,
the receiver noise is modelled as ni(t) which is also assumed to be an i.i.d. Gaussian random process with
zero mean and variance σ2n and hi is the complex gain of the channel between the IU and the i
th OU. Further,
it is assumed that s(t) and n(t) are independent of each other. The received SNR at the ith OU is given as,
γi ,
E[|hi|2]σ2s
σ2n
, (2)
where E[.] represents the expectation operator.
Assume the sensing time-bandwidth product is always close to an integer and is denoted by N = T ×W .
With energy detection, if Ti is the test statistics of an ith user, the local decision rule can be written as [14],
Ti ,
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣xi( jW
)∣∣∣∣2 H1R
H0
λi, (3)
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4where λi is the decision threshold at the ith user. For large values of N (practically when N ≥ 10 [15]),
distribution of Ti converges to a normal distribution with statistics given by,
E [Ti | H0] = Nσ2n E [Ti | H1] = (N + γi)σ2n (4)
Var [Ti | H0] = 2Nσ4n Var [Ti | H1] = 2 (N + 2γi)σ4n, (5)
where Var[.] represents the variance operator. Hence the probability of false alarm P if = Pr(H1 | H0) and
detection P id = Pr(H1 | H1) for an ith user can be written as,
P if = Q
(
λi −Nσ2n√
2Nσ2n
)
(6)
P id = Q
(
λi − (N + γi)σ2n√
2(N + 2γi)σ2n
)
, (7)
where Q(.) is the right tail probability of the standard normal distribution.
B. Hard Decision Combining - HDC
In hard decision fusion, each OU makes a local decision and sends this 1-bit information to the fusion centre
via the common control channel in an orthogonal manner. Let di ∈ {0, 1} represents ith user decision i.e.,
di =
1 if Ti ≥ λi0. otherwise (8)
The fusion center combines decisions from all users and makes a global decision D as,
D = g
(
wh,d
)
, (9)
where d = [d1, d2, · · · , dK ]T, wh =
[
wh1 , w
h
2 , · · · , whK
]T
is the weight vector for HDC and g is the fusion
rule. According to the Neyman-Pearson criteria, approaches based on the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) provide
optimal performance, hence an optimal combining scheme at the fusion centre results in following counting
rule [16],
K∑
j=1
dj loge
P jd
(
1− P jf
)
(
1− P jd
)
P jf
 H1R
H0
λ∗, (10)
where λ∗ is the optimal threshold determined by the target global false alarm probability. To compute λ∗ under
the Neyman-Pearson criteria is mathematically untractable and generally the fusion centre is not aware of local
detection and false alarm probabilities, hence one must use suboptimal solutions [17]. In this article, we select
the counting based fusion rule, g, defined as follows [18],
D = g
(
wh,d
)
=
1 [w
h]Td ≥ ⌈K2 ⌉
0 otherwise
(11)
where wh is calculated using HDC-BR, discussed in section III-B.
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5C. Soft Decision Combining - SDC
In SDC, instead of sending 1-bit information, each user transmits Ti to the fusion centre. The fusion centre
combine observations as,
ys = [w
s]
T T
H1
R
H0
λ∗∗ (12)
where ws = [ws1, w
s
2, · · · , wsK ]T is the weight vector for SDC, T = [T1, T2, · · · , TK ]T is the observation vector
and λ∗∗ again denotes the threshold based on the desired probability of false alarm. Depending on the outcome
of SDC-MG, wsi is either 0 (ith user is identified as DOU) or 1 (ith user is not identified as DOU), i.e.
wsi =
1 Reject hypothesis that i
th user is DOU
0 Cannot reject hypothesis that ith user is DOU
(13)
and is determined by SDC-MG. From equation (12) the distribution of ys at the fusion centre can be written
as,
E [ys | H0] = Nσ2n
∑
i∈Ω
wsi E [ys | H1] =
∑
i∈Ω
[wsi (N + γi)]σ
2
n (14)
Var [ys | H0] = 2Nσ4n
∑
i∈Ω
(wsi )
2 Var [ys | H1] = 2
∑
i∈Ω
[
(N + 2γi)
(
wis
)2]
σ4n. (15)
Hence, threshold λ∗∗ as defined in (12) can be calculated as,
λ∗∗ = Nσ2n
∑
i∈Ω
wsi + Q
−1 (Pf)σ2n√2N∑
i∈Ω
(wsi )
2
, (16)
where
(
Pf
)
is the desired probability of false alarm.
III. PROPOSED REPUTATION BASED COLLABORATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING - HDC
This section provides an overview of the beta reputation system and then describes how the credibility of
each user is built and updated in the HDC-BR scheme.
A. Beta Reputation System
Reputation systems are used to foster good behavior by providing incentives for honest users and to help some
entity to make decisions about whom to trust. Reputation systems have been widely used in several domains e.g.
e-commerce [19], Internet [20], ad-hoc Networks [21] etc. In human society, the credibility of an individual is
established based on his/her interactions with others over the time. Our intent is to develop a similar mechanism
in collaborative spectrum sensing to judge the credibility of each user based on how consistently a users opinion
agrees with rest of the group. In a cognitive radio network, a fusion centre can employ a reputation system to
identify deleterious users quickly and to minimise their contributions in global decision making by assigning
appropriate weights, wh, to the users. A reputation system, CONFIDENT, was introduced in [22] in which
nodes warn each other about deleterious nodes but the system is vulnerable to false accusations. There are other
reputation systems that allow dissimilation of positive information only [23]. In such reputation systems, the
information can still be falsely praised, resulting in a good reputation for deleterious users.
In cognitive radio networks, the requirements are different, as the focus is on the quick isolation of deleterious
users. In this article, we apply the Bayesian approach for reputation updates and propose the use of beta
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6reputation systems. The beta reputation system models the behavior of each OU in each iteration as a binary
event modelled by the beta distribution. Beta distribution provides a sound mathematical basis for combining
decisions from distributed users and for expressing the credibility of each user [24]. Since the true probability
of an OU user to act deleteriously, say p˜ is unknown, we estimate a credibility factor (i.e. ς) from the data
obtained at the fusion centre. We take probability of p˜ i.e. Prob(p˜) from the beta family, whose probability
function is given by,
f(p˜ | α, β) = Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
p˜α−1 (1− p˜)β−1 , 0 ≤ p˜ ≤ 1, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0 (17)
with the restriction that p˜ 6= 0 if α < 1 and p˜ 6= 1 if β < 1 [24]. The first order statistics of the beta distribution
is given as,
E[p˜] =
α
α+ β
(18)
Var[p˜] =
αβ
(α+ β)2(α+ β + 1)
. (19)
The advantage of the beta reputation system is that it only needs two parameters (i.e. α and β) that are
continually updated as decisions are reported to the fusion centre. Further, beta distribution is a suitable option
because of its flexibility and ability to peak at any value in [0, 1] with arbitrarily small variance.
In HDC, the fusion centre has two possible outcomes for each user in each sensing interval; the fusion
centre either categorises di as positive rating or negative rating. Let ζi,t represent the total number of positive
ratings and ηi,t represent the total number of negative ratings in the tth sensing interval where t = 1, 2, · · · .
The probability density function of the outcome that the ith user has a positive rating in the tth sensing interval
is obtained by setting ζi,t = α+ 1 and ηi,t = β + 1 i.e. [24],
f(p˜) =
Γ(ζi,t + ηi,t + 2)
Γ(ζi,t + 1)Γ(ηi,t + 1)
p˜ζi,t (1− p˜)ηi,t ζi,t, ηi,t ≥ 0. (20)
The probability expectation value is defined as E[p˜] which is interpreted as the most likely value of f(p˜).
B. Reputation based mechanism at Fusion Centre - HDC-BR
An opportunistic or cognitive radio user can be classified either as reputable or deleterious based on its current
decision di and the global decision D, calculated from equation (8) and (9). A reputable OU is always honest
i.e. transmitting its actual spectrum sensing observation or decision to the fusion centre, while a DOU is the
one who may be dishonest (as explained in section 1) or honest but its sensing decisions are falsified. In order
to achieve a high credibility score i.e. ς value, an OU needs to be honest and able to provide accurate sensing
observations. The credibility score of each OU is updated at the fusion centre in each sensing interval. The
overall process of implementing HDC-BR can be summarised as follows: All collaborative opportunistic users
perform spectrum sensing in each sensing interval and send their reports to the fusion centre. After receiving
sensing reports from the users, the fusion centre first calculates D using (9) or (11) and then decides if the
ith user is collaborative or not. The fusion centre then update the values of ζj and ηj by incorporating new
observation di as follows:
ζi,t = ζi,t−1 + τ∗i , ηi,t = ηi,t−1 + τ
∗∗
i , (21)
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7where
τ∗i =
1 if di(t) = D(t)0 otherwise (22)
τ∗∗i =
1 if di(t) 6= D(t)0 otherwise (23)
Hence, based on equations (18) to (23), the credibility score ςi of ith user can be written as
ςi(t) , E[p˜] =
ζi,t + 1
ζi,t + ηi,t + 2
. (24)
Finally, the weighting coefficients for the observations of each OU are defined as,
wh(t) =
ςt∑
i∈Ω ςi,t
, (25)
where ςt = [ς1,t, ς2,t, · · · , ςK,t]T. The weight vector defined in equation (25) is updated in each sensing interval
and once a CR user is regarded as unreliable, their observations have less effect on the global decision because
of the users low credibility score. The calculated {whi | i ∈ Ω} is used in the next sensing interval and a final
decision D is calculated using equation (11). It is noted here that the calculation of wh can be performed
between two consecutive sensing intervals hence the computational complexity of the proposed method is low.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF DOUS IN COLLABORATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING - SDC
To defend collaborative spectrum sensing against deleterious users when users send their soft decisions to the
fusion centre, we propose an outlier detection approach based on a Modified Grubbs test (SDC-MG). In SDC-
MG, the fusion centre receives soft decisions from all K users and evaluates the credibility of each user based
on Grubbs test. Unlike the HDC-BR approach discussed in section III, credibility is not building in successive
sensing iterations rather fusion centre assigns tags (0 or 1) with each user observation i.e. deleterious users are
detected immediately and completely eliminated in collaborative spectrum sensing.
A. Modified Grubbs Test for the detection of DOUs
The Grubbs test is one of the most commonly used tests for the detection of a single outlier in univariate
data [25]. It is based on the assumption of normality and in this application soft decisions at the fusion centre can
be reasonably approximated by normal distribution. According to the central limit theorem, for a large number
of samples, the distribution of local sensing observations is approximately Gaussian [26]. For the detection of
multiple DOUs, we implemented a “multiple-outlier” version of the Grubbs test, i.e. we removed one DOU at
a time, reiterating until no DOU remains. Define,
Hn : No DOUs in the received sensing observations (26)
Hy : At least one DOU in the received sensing observations (27)
To detect a DOU, the fusion centre first calculates SDC-MG test statistics i.e. {<k | k = 1, 2, · · · , l} and
corresponding thresholds {ek | k = 1, 2, · · · , l} where l is an initial estimate of the number of DOUs (e.g. it
can be K/2 in the beginning) from the data set containing all K users observations, say TK = {T1, T2, · · · , TK}.
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8If all of the <k ≤ ek where k ≤ l then hypothesis Hn can not be rejected and there is no DOU in the data
set TK and we can assign {wsi = 1 | i ∈ Ω}. If some <k > ek then define j = max{k : <k > ek}, and
declare T (0), T (1), · · · , T (j−1) as the DOU corresponds to the most extreme observations in the successively
reduced data set. In the rest of this section, we explain how test statistics and critical values i.e. <i and ei can
be calculated by the fusion centre.
1) Test Statistics - SDC-MG: Statistic <k is the extreme studentised deviate completed from the data set
n− k + 1. More specifically, the first statistic <1 is given by,
<1 = max (Ti − E[TK ])
2
ST
, i ∈ Ω (28)
where E[TK ] and ST is the mean and standard deviation of the data set TK .
E[TK ] = 1
K
∑
i∈Ω
Ti (29)
ST =
1
K − 1
∑
i∈Ω
(Ti − E[TK ])2 , (30)
Similarly, <2 is computed but with a reduced sample size of K−1 obtained by removing the sensing observation
corresponding to max | Ti − E[TK ] | user from the full set TK and similarly calculate <3, <4 and so on.
2) Calculation of Critical values: As described, <i has to be compared with the critical value ei to decide
if the ith user is a deleterious user. In our scheme for the simultaneous detection of several DOU at the same
time, critical values ei | i ∈ Ω can be obtained from,
Pr

l⋃
i=φ+1
(<i > ei | Hy)
 = α˜, for φ = 0, 1, · · · , l − 1 (31)
where α˜ is the significance level to reject hypothesis Hn. Using simulation, critical values can be calculated
from equation (31), however such an approach is not suitable in our case as it requires a table of estimated
percentiles for {<k | k = 1, 2, · · · , l} [27]. An alternative approach is to approximate critical values from the
t-distribution. For the calculation of critical values we adopt the approximate method proposed by Quesenberry
et. al. [28].
ek+1 =
tK−φ−2,p¯ (K − φ− 1){[
K − φ− 2 + t2K−φ−2,p¯
]
(K − φ)
}2 , φ = 0, 1, 2, · · · , l − 1 (32)
where p¯ = 1 − [(α˜/2)(K − φ)] and ta,b represents the bth percentile of a t-distribution with a degrees of
freedom.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present the simulation results of our proposed credibility based collaborative spectrum
sensing schemes, HDC-BR and SDC-MG. For the simulations, we consider K = 20 opportunistic users in a
cognitive radio network randomly distributed in a certain area such that the mean SNR of the users is uniformly
distributed in the range of −15 to 5dB unless stated otherwise. Each user samples the received signal, N = 10
times and processes N received samples to generate test statistic Ti as defined in equation (3). We assume
that the noise variance σ2n is known to each user and is equal to 1. In our simulations, DOUs do not perform
spectrum sensing but rather send random data to the fusion centre.
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9For the case of HDC-BR, we initially consider all as trusted users and initialise a weight vector wh as a
vector of all ones. To estimate values of probability of false alarm and probability of detection we considered
100, 000 iterations. From extensive simulation, we observed that the weight of all users converges after 10−12
sensing intervals if the channel and user credibility conditions remain constant. If the sensing channel conditions
change slowly then the proposed method will still work. However, if the sensing channel conditions change
quickly, the HDC-BR method becomes invalid and this case is outside the scope of this article.
Similarly for SDC-MG, we initialise wsi = 1 for all values of i ∈ Ω. The fusion centre receives sensing
observations from the nodes and assigns appropriate values to wsi in each sensing interval. Both schemes assign
weighting factors to the user contributions that help nullify the effect of false information in order to enhance
the collaborative spectrum sensing performance in the presence of deleterious users.
In Fig. 1 and 2 we consider a collaborative spectrum sensing system having either no DOU, 10% DOU and
20% DOU and study the impact of deleterious users on the performance of collaborative spectrum sensing.
Deleterious users are selected randomly in our simulations. We plot Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC)
curves for performance evaluation i.e. the probability of miss detection versus the probability of false alarm [8]. It
is clear from Fig. 1 and 2 that presence of deleterious users significantly affects the performance of collaborative
spectrum sensing. For example, with 20 collaborative users and false alarm rates equal to 50%, the presence
of 10% and 20% DOUs can decrease detection rates to 32% and 50% respectively in SDC, while in HDC
detection rates decreases up to 17% with 20% deleterious users. From the simulation results it is clear that
DOUs badly affect the soft decision combining based collaborative spectrum sensing compared to hard decision
combining. This is intuitively clear, since in SDC all users send their sensing observations to the fusion centre
and performance depends on the overall magnitude of false readings.
In our simulation results, we compare the ROC curves for the case in which no deleterious user suppression
scheme using SDC is used and we refer it as DOU-NC. In this case, all users contribute equally in the global
decision making regarding the existence of incumbent users. Further, we compare the performance of our
algorithms with another malicious user detection scheme recently proposed in literature [29]. In [29], authors
propose a novel technique to eliminate DOU in cognitive networks, which they call Statistical Moment Deviation
Detection (SMDD). In SMDD, DOU are detected by detecting variations in the statistical moment of sensing
observations, for details refer to [29]. The proposed schemes i.e. HDC-BR and SDC-MG, are based on the
credibility score of each user, where user observations or decisions are weighted at the fusion centre in order
to nullify the effect of false information.
In Fig. 3 we plot miss detection probability versus false alarm probability when all opportunistic users
receives higher mean SNR values. In particular, we assume that each user receives a mean SNR of γ = 0dB
with 10% DOUs. Compared to DOU-NS and SMDD in the presence of deleterious users, the proposed schemes
demonstrate significant gains in detection probability which is achieved by eliminating the effects of misbehaved
users. Moreover, when the mean SNR of users is high, HDC-BR performs better than the SDC-MG scheme.
Figure 4 shows the ROC curves with 10% deleterious opportunistic users with very low received SNR for all
opportunistic users. Here, we assume received SNR at each user terminal is −10dB. With very low SNR, the
SDC-MG scheme performs much better than HDC-BR. Hence, we conclude here that in low SNR regimes
SDC-MG is better than HDC-BR while with high received SNR, the performance of HDC-BR is superior to
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SDC-MG. To further substantiate these conclusions, miss detection probability was plotted versus received SNR
for a given probability of false alarm in Fig. 5. The value of Pf was fixed to 0.5 and number of DOUs as 10%.
It is clear from Fig. 5 that with SDC-MG, 20 users can detect a signal with average received SNR as low as
−15dB with detection probability of 81.4% while with DOC-NC and HDC-BR such a low SNR signal can be
detected with detection probability of 39.6% and 39.2% respectively.
In Fig. 6 we consider a scenario in which received mean SNR at the receiving terminals of OUs is low
and uniformly distributed in the range of −15 to 5dB. We assumed there are 10% DOC which are randomly
choosen from K = 20 users. From Fig. 6 it is clear that in low SNR regimes, performance of SHC-MG is
significantly better than the HDC-BR and the scheme is able to detect and eliminate all 20% deleterious users.
Hence, we can draw the conclusion that for higher received SNR the preferred scheme is HDC-BR, which also
incurs less communication overhead. However for the case of low SNR, SDC-MG is able to reliably detect and
isolate mischievous users.
In order to estimate the number of users that our proposed schemes are able to detect, we further plotted the
probability of detection versus the number of deleterious opportunistic users for a fixed SNR of −5dB and for
a given probability of false alarm, Pf = 0.5 (Fig. 7). The main conclusion that can be drawn from Fig. 7 is
that, to a certain extent, both schemes can provide better performance if the number of deleterious users does
not exceed K/2, i.e 50%. If more than half of the users are deleterious users than the proposed schemes do
not improve detection performance. This result is consistent with the logical argument that if there are more
deleterious users, then a global decision may be wrong and neither HDC-BR nor SDC-MG schemes are able
to detect deleterious opportunistic users.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, collaborative spectrum sensing schemes that are able to detect deleterious users in cognitive
radio networks have been proposed. We considered collaborative spectrum sensing scenarios where a user can
either send a 1-bit decision or energy detector output to a central control (i.e. fusion centre) in order to determine
the presence of incumbent users. In each case, a scheme to assign weights to individual users contributions for
each sensing interval has been proposed. The procedure to identify deleterious users and reduce their impact
on the overall global decision making at the fusion centre has been described. The proposed schemes do
not require any feedback from the incumbent system and do not need any assistance from a trusted node.
Further, our schemes do not require an exact number of deleterious opportunistic users to work. However, the
inherent assumption is that there are more trusted users than deleterious users in the network. We analysed the
performance of the proposed schemes with comprehensive simulations, and compared the simulation results
with existing malicious user detection scheme available in the literature. The proposed schemes show significant
advantages, primarily that they can identify deleterious users and eliminate their impact on the decision making.
Our main conclusion is that if the average received SNR at users is high then HDC-BR performs better than
SDC-MG while in the low SNR case, SDC-MG outperforms HDC-BR.
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Fig. 1. Effect of Deleterious users on the performance of collaborative spectrum sensing in HDC, N = 10, K = 20 and γi = −15 to
5dB uniformly distributed
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Fig. 2. Effect of Deleterious users on the performance of collaborative spectrum sensing in SDC, N = 10, K = 20 and γi = −15 to
5dB uniformly distributed
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Fig. 3. Probability of miss detection versus false alarm probability in the presence of 10% Deleterious Opportunistic Users, N = 10,
K = 20 and γi = 0dB
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Fig. 4. Probability of miss detection versus false alarm probability in the presence of 10% Deleterious Opportunistic Users, N = 10,
K = 20 and γi = −10dB
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Fig. 5. Miss detection probability versus SNR with 10% Deleterious Opportunistic Users, N=10, K=20 and Pf = 0.5
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Fig. 6. ROC Curves with 10% Deleterious Opportunistic Users, N = 10, K = 20 and γi = −15 to 5dB uniformly distributed
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Fig. 7. Probability of Detection versus number of deleterious opportunistic users with N = 10, K = 20, Pf = 0.5 and γ = −5dB
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